Efecto spillover ante un evento laboral, un análisis empírico para el mercado continuo español by Sabater Marcos, Ana María & Laffarga Briones, Joaquina
 Recibido 22-10-05 · Aceptado 21-02-08 · Copyright © 2001 Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de Empresas · ISSN: 0210-2412
REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE FINANCIACIÓN Y CONTABILIDAD
Vol. XXXVII, n.º 140 · octubre-diciembre 2008 · pp. 633-664 ARTÍCULOS DOCTRINALES 633
Spillover effect upon a labor event: 
an empirical analysis for the Spanish 
continuous market *
Efecto spillover ante un evento laboral,
un análisis empírico
para el mercado continuo español
Ana María Sabater Marcos **. Universidad Miguel Hernández
Joaquina Laffarga Briones. Universidad de Sevilla
RESUMEN El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el efecto desbordamiento o spillover del Mercado 
Continuo Español ante la fi rma de un convenio colectivo a nivel empresa. Empíricamente, para el 
mercado español, se ha demostrado que un convenio de empresa incorpora información negativa 
para los inversores por el hecho de que este tipo de convenios sesga al alza los salarios respecto a 
los del sector, lo que conlleva la venta de los títulos afectados y una caída en su precio. Este trabajo 
analiza si este evento laboral tiene también contenido informativo para los inversores de las empresas 
competidoras, es decir, si existe efecto spillover. La llegada de la nueva información que contiene la 
fi rma del convenio podría afectar a las empresas competidoras de distinta forma dependiendo del 
sector. Los resultados generales de este trabajo confi rman esta hipótesis, si bien se observan reaccio-
nes distintas dependiendo del sector al cual pertenezca la empresa y del nivel de concentración de la 
oferta productiva que posean. 
PALABRAS CLAVE Efecto Industria; Negociación Colectiva; Rentabilidades Anormales; Competencia.
ABSTRACT  The aim of this paper is to analyse the reaction of the stock prices of competing com-
panies to the signature of a fi rm-level collective agreement. Considering that this type of agreement 
slants to the rise the wages of these fi rms with respect to those of the sector, we have found empirical 
evidence that, for the Spanish Market, a fi rm-level agreement incorporates information that could be 
negatively considered by the investors of the companies which sign own agreement. This would entail 
a sale of the affected titles whose price would then fall. This paper analyses whether this event affects 
the stock price of competing companies, that is, whether a spillover effect exist. The arrival of the new 
information inherent in the signature of the agreement could have a different effect on competing 
companies based on the type of competition in their industry. The general results of this paper confi rm 
the spillover effect, although different reactions are observed depending on the industry to which the 
company belongs and their level of concentration. 
KEY WORDS  Spillover Effect; Collective Bargaining; Abnormal Returns; Competition.
1. INTRODUCTION
Business profi tability has been a constant concern in economic research, which has ba-
sically examined parameters and factors involved in profi tability, concentrating on the 
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characteristics of the company or on the structure of the market. Nevertheless, collective 
bargaining has seldom been considered as decisive in terms of profi tability (1).
Many labor market analysts agree on the impact that the structure of collective bargain-
ing may have in fi xing wages and in productivity. These aspects can have signifi cant the 
evolution of company earnings. However, it is not generally easy to explain variations in 
profi tability through variations in wages or productivity. This infl uence is better analyzed 
measuring the impact that negotiation of a labor agreement has on company value. 
Collective bargaining in Spain is characterized by a widely used system based on a two-
level negotiation: bargaining at fi rm level and at industry level. Sector-level collective bar-
gaining establishes the lower limits applicable to every worker within a specifi c sector in 
terms of labor and economic conditions. The company may, on its turn, voluntarily improve 
the conditions set up for the sector agreement and, thus, supersede them (2). Bronars and 
Deere (1994) for the American market, and Inurrieta (1977b), Sabater and Laffarga (2006) 
for Spain, have shown that the signature of a fi rm level collective agreement brings about a 
fall in stock prices and minor volatility the days around the event. This reaction is justifi ed 
because the wage increase derived from this type of agreements increases staff expenses 
as well. This fact can reduce the value of future cash fl ow, with a subsequent loss of wealth 
for the investor. If this situation takes place, it means that investors consider labor relations 
within the company with particular emphasis on the collective negotiation.
Bentolila et al. (1996) indicated that the effects of collective bargaining in some companies 
are projected outside the fi rm itself and have strategic effects on the market for goods as 
well as in the fi xing of wages within the sector. These strategic effects depend, in essence, 
on the different asymmetries between companies and should be refl ected in the relative 
value of the company. 
This study aims at analyzing whether the signature of a fi rm level collective agreement 
also provides information for the investors of the competing companies; that is, if there is a 
spillover effect. The specifi c goal is to show whether a company signing its own agreement 
induces changes in stock prices of competing companies. Spillover effect on the Spanish 
Stock Market are analyzed with respect to this type of labor events.
The main contribution of this study is to be found in the analysis of the direct impact that 
union negotiation power may exert, upon the signature of a company agreement, on the 
stock price of the competing companies. Moreover, the analysis is also linked to the degree 
of concentration in the production supply of each sector. By doing so, we avoid the need to 
model production functions which, in their dynamic version, refl ect adjustment costs of the 
different productive factors.
Our results provide evidence on the existence of abnormal returns of different nature and 
magnitude depending on the sector analyzed: everything depends on the specifi c charac-
(1) Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Hirschey (1985). 
(2) Jimeno and Rodríguez (1996) found out that companies with their own bargaining agreement paid a 5% premium 
while other fi rms regulated only by the sector agreement did not.
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teristics of the sector as well as on the level or degree of concentration of its productive 
supply.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The second section of the study presents 
the empirical evidence and the development of the hypotheses. In the third section, data 
collection is presented by means of a descriptive analysis of accounting and fi nancial vari-
ables from companies with signed agreement and their competitors. The degree of con-
centration of the sectors to which the companies of the sample belong to is also calculated 
in this section. The fourth section refl ects on the methodology and the different results ob-
tained in value variation of companies with agreement and their competitors; after estab-
lishing the existence of different reactions in returns, the fi fth section studies whether the 
change in expectations for investors is infl uenced by company factors, that is size, annual 
earnings and industry effect; fi nally, section six presents the conclusions.
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS
Although there is ample bibliography on spillover effect, it has mainly been concerned 
with the overfl ow effect produced by research and development as shown by Bernstein 
and Nadiri (1988), Griliches (1992), Mamuneas (1999), Park (1995) or Crespo et al. (2004), 
among others.
There has been little empirical evidence used to analyze spillover effect in a context of 
collective bargaining. There are two types of studies: those which analyze the direct in-
fl uence on the wages of competing companies; and a second group focusing on the price 
variations of competing companies around the date of publication of the announcement. 
With a focus on the American Market, Freeman and Medoff (1981) and Pencavel (1991) 
analyze what happens to wages of competing companies when one of them implements an 
increase. Freeman and Medoff (1981) calculate spillover effect on wages in the manufac-
turing industry, from 1973 to 1975, by measuring the existing correlation between wages 
of companies with union presence and those without. No signifi cant repercussion is found. 
However, Pencavel (1991) does show existence of certain spillover effect in the negotiation 
power of a company over the wages of the competition.
The measurement of spillover effect over stock price has been studied by Bronars and 
Deere (1994). From results obtained by Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), Bronars and 
Deere estimate the impact that requests made by union representatives to the National 
Labor Relations Board has on competing companies quoted on NYSE. The results show 
a negative 0,72% spillover effect. The authors conclude that greater union power in a 
company with less market value is compatible and it does not purport an increase in labor 
costs for the competition. The explanation lies in the possibility of implementing anti-union 
strategies on the part of the employers in order to compensate for the foreseeable wage 
increases. This possibility in the Spanish case is not institutionally viable.
Jimeno and Rodríguez (1996) argue that there are sectors more prone to sign company 
agreements. This may either be because of union tradition or because of greater sector 
concentration, which favors a greater possibility to obtain profi t through the negotiation. 
Salinger (1984) and Inurrieta (1997a) point that such sectors are most penalized by the 
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market, since collective negotiation at company level has a major (negative) effect in those 
sectors where a greater volume of profi t can be obtained. With the use of the CAPM model 
and providing annual data, Inurrieta (1997a) indicates that, in the Spanish case, collec-
tive negotiation in a company reduces returns of competing companies within more con-
centrated sector in a 0.2 percent. According to the author, a possible explanation for this 
fi gures is that when a company signs its own agreement in a highly concentrated sector, 
optimal balance for the rest of the employees of the rest of companies can only be achieved 
by also signing company agreements; profi t of these companies subsequently falls. Another 
possible explanation for this, always according to Inurrieta (1997a), could be found in the 
show effect, especially in highly-concentrated sectors, in which the leading company has its 
own company agreement and the other companies reproduce such a situation.
As a point of departure, then, if we consider that when a company signs a collective agree-
ment brings about an effect that reaches out to the other companies in the sector, it is pos-
sible to wonder if all sectors would react similarly. Since a company agreement modifi es 
wages and work conditions with an upward tendency, we could expect a possible correla-
tion (sign beforehand ambiguous) between the structure of the negotiation of any company 
and the profi t of competing companies. Bronars and Deere (1994) indicate that sign and 
magnitude of the spillover effect will a priori depend on the degree of concentration within 
the sector.
In this sense, it would be reasonable to expect a negative spillover effect when the signature 
of a company agreement provokes a revision of wages also in competitors. This situation 
occurs in highly-concentrated sectors in which the company signing its own agreement is 
the sector leader, or behaves as it were. Subsequently investors of competitors are con-
cerned their employees would consider the situation of the leading company a justifi cation 
to demand better wages or even to propose the signature of a company agreement. Hence 
our fi rst hypothesis:
H1:  The sectors with greater concentration level of the productive supply experience a 
negative spillover effect.
Moreover, if we suppose benefi ts of companies represent a decreasing function of the 
product level of their competitors, as Inurrieta (1997a) argues: any variable modifying 
the production level of company i (and wages can modify it) must have an impact on the 
benefi ts (and therefore on the stock returns) of companies within the same sector. A posi-
tive spillover effect could be expected in sectors with a market proportionally distributed 
among companies. In these sectors, labor costs increase as a consequence of the agree-
ment causes an increase of production costs, which implies a loss of market quota. Com-
peting companies benefi t from this loss. Thus, the reaction expected in investors of compet-
ing companies should be positive. Then, our second hypothesis:
H2:  Sectors with smaller level of concentration of the productive supply experience a posi-
tive spillover effect.
Previous empirical studies, Inurrieta (1997b) or Sabater and Laffarga (2006) have demon-
strated that the signature of this type of agreement has a signifi cant and negative impact on 
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the market. It has also been shown that, up to now, reaction of the rival company is always 
inferior to the one of the signatory company. We, therefore, raised our last hypothesis:
H3:  The average return of a portfolio comprising by shares of competing companies is 
higher than the returns of a portfolio comprising shares of a company which has 
signed an agreement.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. SAMPLES
In order to carry out the analysis of spillover effect we need to obtain two samples, composed 
by companies with their own agreements and another comprising their competitors.
Our main sample covers companies quoted on the Spanish Continuous Market that signed 
a fi rm-level collective agreement between 1995 and 2002. First, we obtained the 230 fi rm-
level collective agreements signed in companies quoted on Spanish Continuous Market 
from the Collective Agreement Register. As time 0, or zero moment, i.e.: the date on which 
the signature is known to the market, we chose the date on which the fi rm-level agree-
ment was signed. In order to verify whether the date selected as zero moment was correct, 
we conducted a data search for when the events were published in the economic press. 
The search was conducted in the Baratz database of economic press and in the website 
of the National Stock Market Commission (CNMV) (3). We found that the announcement of 
the agreement is published on the very day the agreement is signed, which confi rms the 
validity of the date selected.
In order to test for abnormal behaviour in the returns of the companies, we then selected 
the length of the event window. We considered the fi ve days before and after the zero mo-
ment due to the fact that, although most information on collective agreements is usually 
quickly incorporated into stock prices, information may sometimes leak out before formal 
publication, or publication may be delayed.
We excluded from the sample announcements in whose event window announcements 
were made on other relevant events for the company, such as mergers, splits, equity issues 
or dividend announcements, among others. This allowed us to measure only the effect of 
the new agreement; excluding, also, any potential confusing effects. 
The sample remaining after these exclusions consisted of 84 fi rm-level collective agree-
ments related to 40 companies over a period of 8 years, 1995-2002 (4). The companies 
were classifi ed by sector according to the National Classifi cation of Economic Activities 
(CNAE-93). There was a two-digit breakdown level. The industries are S1 = Food and 
beverage; S2 = Paper products; S3 = Petroleum, refi ned petroleum products and process-
ing of radioactive materials; S4 = Chemical products; S5 = Non-metallic mineral products; 
(3) The Spanish SEC.
(4) Agreements may be signed every two or three years, that is why a company can sign more than one agreements for 
the period under study.
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S6 = Basic Metal; S7 = Industrial machinery; S8 = Electronic material; S9 = Electric Power; 
S10 = Trade and other services; S11 = Transport and communication; S12 = Financial.
The next step in the analysis of the spillover effect requires a sample composed of compet-
ing fi rms, i.e.: for each date and company signing a fi rm-level collective agreement, we 
obtain competing companies in the same industry, they had a two-digit CNAE breakdown 
level, and quoted on Spanish Continuous Market, but not experiencing the event, i.e.: not 
having signed a fi rm-level collective agreement. For greater robustness in the results, we 
consider as competing fi rms companies not signing a fi rm-level collective agreement and 
not undergoing conversions, equity issues, mergers, splits or others events, as these could 
contaminate results. Total is 447 elements distributed among the different sectors of study, 
and corresponding to 97 competing companies (5).
The fi rst panel in Table 1 indicates the distribution per year and sector of the companies 
with agreement, and the second panel displays the distribution of the sample of competing 
companies.
TABLE 1
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION AMONG YEARS AND SECTORS
Distribution of fi rm-level collective agreements or events per year and industry and competing sample per year and industry. The 
industries are S1 = Food and beverage; S2 = Paper products; S3 = Petroleum, Refi ned petroleum products and processing of 
radioactive materials; S4 = Chemical products; S5 = Non-metallic mineral products ; S6 = Basic Metal; S7 = Industrial machinery; 
S8 = Electronic material; S9 = Electric Power; S10 = Trade and other services; S11 = Transport and communication; S12 = Financial.
PANEL A. EVENT SAMPLE
Industry/Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
S1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 6
S2 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 4
S3 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 7
S4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 6
S5 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
S6 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
S7 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 7
S8 1 2 1 2 1 0 2 0 9
S9 1 4 3 2 2 0 2 2 16
S10 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 5
S11 0 0 2 3 2 2 1 2 12
S12 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 5
TOTAL 16 13 12 10 9 9 10 5 84
(Continúa pág. sig.)
(5) A company may be the competitor of several other companies in the sector.
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PANEL B. COMPETING SAMPLE
Industry/Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
S1 3 7 6 0 0 7 7 5 35
S2 4 0 0 0 4 0 8 0 16
S3 3 4 2 3 0 1 0 0 13
S4 7 5 4 0 6 0 0 0 22
S5 9 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
S6 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 7
S7 7 0 10 6 5 9 8 0 45
S8 9 10 11 9 6 0 9 0 54
S9 5 24 14 11 7 0 10 13 84
S10 6 7 0 7 0 6 5 0 31
S11 0 0 12 11 10 8 6 8 55
S12 17 14 13 0 11 11 0 0 66
TOTAL 70 81 72 47 49 49 53 26 447
The fi rst panel in Table 1 corresponds to the group of companies with company agree-
ment. It is worth mentioning that, for the period under study, a 20% of the total agreements 
signed took place in 95, whereas only a 5% appears for 2002 (6). The rest of the period 
displays an average of 10 company agreements per year. If we pay attention to sector 
distribution, we can fi nd that Electric power and Trade and Electronic material show the 
highest number of agreements.
With regard to the sample of competing companies, there more instances documented for 
the analysis of the spillover effect in the sectors of Industrial machinery, Electronic mate-
rial, Electric power, Transport and communication and fi nancial. In the rest of sectors, the 
sample ranges between 15 and 30 instances by sector. Because of this, as will be shown, 
the non-parametric technique bootstrap has been used in order to solve the statistical 
problem of a reduced number of instances. 
3.2. DATA, VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the impact of the event on returns, daily returns data of companies 
from both samples was collected for the period 1-2-1995 to 12-31-2002. IBEX-35 is used 
as a proxy for the market portfolio. The data was obtained from the SIBE database.
In order to assess whether there is a consistent relationship between abnormal returns of 
competing companies and their company characteristics we used industry specifi c, dummy 
(6) The difference in number of agreements signed for every year may be no mean that there were less of them, the 
number may be the result of the fi lter used for the sample. 
TABLE 1 (cont.)
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION AMONG YEARS AND SECTORS
Distribution of fi rm-level collective agreements or events per year and industry and competing sample per year and industry. The 
industries are S1 = Food and beverage; S2 = Paper products; S3 = Petroleum, Refi ned petroleum products and processing of 
radioactive materials; S4 = Chemical products; S5 = Non-metallic mineral products ; S6 = Basic Metal; S7 = Industrial machinery; 
S8 = Electronic material; S9 = Electric Power; S10 = Trade and other services; S11 = Transport and communication; S12 = Financial.
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variables. Other variables are also used like company size, measured as market capitaliza-
tion and obtained from Compustat. Other variables and data collected come from annual 
audit reports: number of employees, labor cost by employee and results for the year.
If we are to expect that the sign of spillover effect varies according to the degree of con-
centration of the sector, some premises apply: that the leading company is the largest 
company, the one with a greater quota of participation on the rest, the one with greater 
operational income, the one with more prestige. For this reason it seems interesting to 
examine the most signifi cant differences in some variables, as documented in companies 
with agreement and competing companies. In order to do, the following variables were 
selected: size, number of employees, labor cost by employee and annual earnings. All of 
these variables are from the year the company agreement was signed. Means analysis is 
carried out and signifi cance for the t statistical is provided.
If compared to competing companies, the magnitude and signifi cance of the variable size 
shows that, in terms of market capitalization, greater companies with company agreement 
belong to the following sectors: Paper industry, Chemical Industry, Basic Metal, Transport 
and communication and Financial. Conversely, in Trade and other services, greater com-
panies belong to the group of rival companies.
If we consider the variable number of employees, results are similar to those referring to 
size. In fact, number of employees is a variable which previous research has used as proxy 
for company size.
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING, VARIABLES FOR COMPANIES WITH FIRM-LEVEL
AND COMPETING SAMPLE
Averages of certain fi nancial and accounting variables in event sample (M1) and competing sample (M2).
INDUSTRY Simple Size Employment LC/employ
Annual
earnings
 S1. Food and beverage
M1
M2
189.64
288.72
2258.20
3398.22
45.80*
36.83
24019.25
25161.44
 S2. Paper products
M1
M2
901.39**
106.38
1591.75
2748.60
45.00***
29.30
51875.57***
-4150.74
 S3.  Petroleum. refi ned petroleum and 
radioactive.
M1
M2
6287.12
6561.24
14996.43
13580.50
40.71
40.38
593065.78
433411.44
 S4. Chemical products
M1
M2
12173.52***
102.48
1175.50
984.75
45.00
39.50
44570.71***
8572.19
 S5. Non-metalic- mineral products
M1
M2
542.68*
132.29
2710.40
535.33
70.80**
30.00
54983.40***
13788.57
 S6. Basic metal
M1
M2
1126.25**
386.54
16073.00**
1575.67
38.00
33.50
375360.00***
56188.96
(Continúa pág. sig.)
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 S7. Industial machinery
M1
M2
2174.98**
136.78
2150.86
2492.67
45.17*
31.00
44849.14*
12431.92
 S8. Electronic material
M1
M2
307.47
520.47
1970.75*
3443.43
31.38
33.29
6416.89**
19611.22
 S9. Electric power
M1
M2
5436.64
6091.16
5651.00
8534.62
49.50
45.23
291958.79
330380.69
S10. Trade and other services
M1
M2
339.74***
1119.02
2060.20**
10103.14
24.20*
17.00
22629.89*
64677.89
S11. Transport and communications
M1
M2
29388.29***
3990.32
60417.25**
3113.80
38.75
39.30
987748.10***
-60972.10
S12. Financial
M1
M2
15993.92**
1994.71
32668.4***
3024.76
67.67**
39.53
968871.08***
82729.62
Size: Market capitalization Million €; Employment: Number of employees the year of the agreement; Labour costs/number of employees in thousand €; 
Earnings: annual earnings in million €.; The industries are S1 = Food and beverage; S2 = Paper products; S3 = Petroleum, Refi ned petroleum products and 
processing of radioactive materials; S4 = Chemical products; S5 = Non-metallic mineral products; S6 = Basic metal; S7 = Industrial machinery; S8 = Elec-
tronic material; S9 = Electric power; S10 = Trade and other services; S11 = Transport and communication; S12 = Financial. 
* Signifi cantly different at 10%; ** Signifi cantly different at 5%; *** Signifi cantly different at 1%.
As advanced in the introduction, collective bargaining in Spain is characterized by a widely 
used two-level negotiation, sector and company level. Firstly, sector agreement is negotiat-
ed. The company may voluntarily on its turn dissociate itself from the agreement and sign 
its own labor and economic conditions in a company agreement. Besides improving eco-
nomic conditions, a company negotiation essentially provides exclusive conditions for its 
workers. This is particularly the case in sectors in which very different companies (in terms 
of size, for example) coexist, and the sector agreement is not always suitable for all of them. 
Those companies without a company agreement are regulated by the sector agreement by 
default. It is worth emphasizing that sectors like Food and beverage, Petroleum, refi ned 
petroleum products and processing of radioactive materials do not have sector agreement; 
all companies have their own agreement. As can be seen in Table 2, values of these sectors, 
in which all companies have their own agreement, indicate that no signifi cant differences 
between both groups of companies exist. The competing companies group is composed by 
those which, in spite of having their own agreement, have not signed any that year.
Conversely, we found all fi nancial organizations regulated by the sector agreement in the 
fi nancial sector. Those companies which dissociate themselves from the sector agreement 
and pact their own conditions are bigger companies, with a greater number of employees 
and a better fi nancial position than their competitors.
Among the labor and economic conditions negotiated in agreements, wage increase is 
most important. In order to check that the increase in labor costs in companies signing this 
type of agreements is not simply due to an increase in the number of employees, the vari-
able labor cost by employee is analyzed. If Table 2 is considered for the majority of sectors, 
TABLE 2 (cont.)
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING, VARIABLES FOR COMPANIES WITH FIRM-LEVEL
AND COMPETING SAMPLE
Averages of certain fi nancial and accounting variables in event sample (M1) and competing sample (M2).
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labor cost by employee is greater in companies with fi rm-level agreement. In particular, it 
is signifi cantly greater for companies in the sectors of paper, non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts, trade and fi nancial.
If we pay attention to earnings, the positive difference in favor of the companies with fi rm-
level agreement indicates that they have better results, in spite of the labor cost increase 
by employee. If compared to competitors, companies with a fi rm-level agreement, in par-
ticular, paper, chemicals, other non-metal products, basic metal, transport and fi nance 
companies display greater accounting returns. It should be emphasized that the biggest 
companies with higher earnings are, for unions, the target to get profi t from in internal 
negotiations (also in Jimeno and Rodriguez, 1996). 
3.3. CONCENTRATION INDICES
In this paper, the concentration level of the productive supply is going to be calculated for 
the different sectors represented in the companies sampled for 1995-2002.
The degree of concentration of the market supply in the different economic sectors pro-
vides valuable information to determine the degree of competition in the sector.
By measuring the concentration level, we try to ascertain to what extent the activity in a 
sector is controlled by just a few companies. The degree of concentration of a sector de-
pends on two variables: total number of companies in the sector and difference in size, as 
defi ned by number of employees and production. Thus, the more concentrated an activ-
ity is the fewer the companies in the sector or the more difference in size there is among 
them.
In order to measure concentration a great number of indices, usually refer to as like con-
centration indices, have been developed. Among the best known indices, we may for ex-
ample refer to: Entropy Index, Exponential, Herfi ndahl, Standard Herfi ndahl, Gini and 
Lorenz’s Curve Index. These indices of concentration display different factors; this is the 
reason why the use of one of them depends on the event under study.
Company size can be assessed in terms of production or number of employees. Different 
factors have been suggested: sales volume, added value, number of employees, capital and 
assets. According to Michelini and Pickford (1985), the use of one factor over another has 
an effect on the value of the measurement. It has been statistically shown by Bailey and 
Boyle (1971) that there is a strong correlation among the different concentration rates ob-
tained from the different variables. Thus, choosing variable to the detriment another will 
add no relevant information unless the goal is to establish a comparison. In spite of this 
fact, the variables used the most are sales volume and employment; this is fundamentally 
due to the little diffi culty data collection entails. For the purposes of this article, number 
of employees has been selected measure of the size. In addition, taking into consideration 
the direct relation between employment and added value, the use of employment data to 
calculate the concentration indices is appropriate.
Several studies analyze concentration of the industrial sectors in Spain from the Sixties 
with data from different sources, the use of different units of analysis, and different types of 
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measurements. Within this body of research, we may fi nd García Durán (1976), Maravall 
(1976), Aguiló (1979), Escorsa and Herrero (1982), La Fuente y Salas (1983), Mato (1986), 
Segura (1989), Pablo (1995), Rodriguez Romero (1996) and Buesa and Molero (1998). 
With respect to the service sector, and due to the diffi culty to collect the necessary data, the 
only research which has measured the degree of concentration are the articles by Bajo and 
Salas (1998), Núñez (2000) and Núñez and Pérez (2001).
The concentration indices refl ect the concentration degree in a specifi c sector. On the one
 χihand, these indices take as a reference market share of in the sector defi ned as Si = ——— N
 Σ χi
 
1
where Xi is the added value, or employment of company i; and on the other hand, the 
concentration curve, which successively accumulates market share of all the companies 
ranked, in terms of size, in a decreasing order. Thus, the concentration indices depend on 
the two variables defi ning them: number of companies and the degree of inequality in size. 
However, these two variables are given different the weight in the different indices, so the 
arrangement of the sectors may vary according to the index being used.
In this paper, we have used, two ratios of concentration CR(k) based on the market share 
only in the hands of the dominant companies in the sector. They are defi ned as market 
share representing the K major companies. The companies are classifi ed in decreasing 
order according to their participation in the sector. Thus, we consider K = 5 and K = 10.
 k
 CR (k) = Σ S2i (1)
 i = 1
On the other hand, since these ratios only consider the participation of the K major compa-
nies, Herfi ndahl concentration index has been used, because it takes into account partici-
pation of all the companies in the sector (N). It is defi ned as:
 N
 H = Σ S2i (2)
 i = 1
Herfi ndahl index takes the maximum value 1 in case of a monopolistic industry, and mini-
mum value 1/N in the case of N equal companies. Market concentration and competitive-
ness are closely related. Since concentration is associated to monopoly power, the more 
concentrated a market is, the more its operation is of a monopolistic type; and the less 
concentrated the more competitive its operation (7).
For the calculation of the concentration indices for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002, we have used the company directory of the National Institute 
(7) See Schmalensee (1977), Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980), Baumol et al. (1982), Clark andy Davies (1982), Hirschey 
(1985), Jaumandreu and Mato (1985), Jaumandreu (1987), Scherer and Ross (1990), Schmalensee (1992), Gandoy (1988), 
and Martin (1993).
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for Statistics (INE). Data related to number of companies and employees for the different 
sectors is taken from INE, with a two-digit breakdown level from the National Classifi cation 
of Economic Activities of 1993 (CNAE-93) and in twelve types:
• Companies with no employees.
• Companies between 1 and 2 employees.
• Companies between 3 and 5 employees.
• Companies between 6 and 9 employees. 
• Companies between 10 and 19 employees.
• Companies between 20 and 49 employees.
• Companies between 50 and 99 employees.
• Companies between 100 and 199 employees.
• Companies between 200 and 499 employees.
• Companies between 500 and 999 employees.
• Companies between 1000 and 4999 employees.
• Companies with more than 5000 employees.
There is, therefore, available information about number of companies and employees for 
each size.
In order to calculate the concentration indices from this information, two assumptions 
have been made: fi rst of all, companies with no employees are those of self-employed 
workers, so one worker is assigned for every company. Secondly, for each type of company, 
it has been assumed the same number of employees, which is also equal to the average 
number for the whole type (8). Therefore, companies of the same type and sector are of the 
same size: it is the result of dividing total number of employees in the type by the number 
of companies (9).
Three concentration indices have been calculated: CR (5), CR (10) and Herfi ndahl. These 
indices have been calculated for the different sectors represented by the sampled com-
panies, with a two-digit breakdown level with respect to the CNAE-93. Results appear in 
Table 3.
The concentration indices calculated for each sector of activity represented in the compa-
nies of the sample can be checked in panel A, Table 3. If the different concentration indices 
are considered, CR (5) and CR (10) on the one hand and Herfi ndahl on the other, it follows 
that the arrangement of sectors based on the concentration degree is relatively independ-
ent from the index used. In order to compare the results obtained among the different sec-
tors, the average for each of three concentration indices displaying similar results, CR (5), 
CR (10) and Herfi ndahl has been calculated. This solves the little differences resulting from 
the application of the different indices.
(8) See Núñez and Pérez (2001).
(9) This assumption undervalues the concentration level. However, as prior evidence shows, errors resulting from imple-
menting this assumption after a sensitivity analysis are minor; and the relative order of sectors by concentration level is not 
changed much. 
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TABLE 3
TWO-DIGIT CONCENTRATION INDICES FOR INDUSTRIES REPRESENTED 
BY COMPANIES IN SAMPLE 
AVERAGE FOR YEARS 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002
In the fi rst and second column, Panel A shows the results corresponding to the degree of concentration of the productive supply of 
the 5 and 10 biggest companies in each sector, respectively. The third column shows Herfi ndahl index. Panel B classifi es the sectors 
from lower to higher degree of concentration based on the average from the three calculated indices.
PANEL A. INDUSTRY CR (5) CR (10) Herfi ndahl
S1. Food and beverage 0.030 0.054 0.001
S2. Paper products 0.160 0.332 0.667
S3. Petroleum. refi ned petroleum and radioactive 0.879 0.982 0.237
S4. Chemical products 0.408 0.305 0.027
S5. Non-metalic- mineral products 0.069 0.091 0.001
S6. Basic metal 0.189 0.296 0.014
S7. Industial machinery 0.352 0.347 0.206
S8. Electronic material 0.048 0.095 0.005
S9. Electric power 0.417 0.636 0.056
S10. Trade and other services 0.009 0.027 0.0002
S11. Transports and communications 0.868 0.941 0.629
S12. Financial 0.456 0.571 0.133
PANEL B. INDUSTRIES ORDERED FROM LOWER TO HIGHER DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION AVERAGE
S10. Trade and other services 0.0120
 S1. Food and beverage 0.0283
 S8. Electronic material 0.0495
 S5. Non-metalic- mineral products 0.0539
 S6. Basic metal 0.1677
 S4. Chemical products 0.2473
 S7. Industial machinery 0.2986
 S9. Electric power 0.3697
 S2. Paper products 0.3796
S12. Financial 0.3845
 S3. Petroleum. refi ned petroleum and radioactive. 0.6993
S11. Transports and communications 0.8098
Thus, Panel B of Table 3 shows activities classifi ed according to their degree of concentra-
tion, from lower to higher degree, resulting from the calculated average. Thus, sectors 
displaying a lower concentration level and, therefore a more competitive market structure 
are Food and beverage, Trade and other services and Electronic material. Conversely, the 
sectors displaying a monopolistic competition are those with greater concentration indices, 
like for example, Transport and communication, Petroleum, Refi ned petroleum products 
and processing of radioactive materials and Financial.
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4. SPILLOVER EFFECT
4.1. METHODOLOGY
As already mentioned in the introduction, our objective here is to verify whether collective 
bargaining the fi rm level has an impact its stock returns of event and those of competing 
companies. For this purpose we will use the Event Study approach (10).
Since stock prices should refl ect the intrinsic value of a company and are expected to 
change immediately in response to any event that may potentially affect the fi rm’s future 
cash-fl ows, we can measure the impact on corporate value of a given event by observing 
stock price changes over a very short time period around the date of the event. The fi rst 
variable is the abnormal return observed for the fi rm and its competitors, around the date 
of the event. Based on the market model.
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit  (3)
where Rit is the return of company i on day t; Rmt is the return of the market portfolio on 
day t; αi is the expected return of company i, which is independent from the market; βi is 
the sensitivity of the return of company i to changes in market return; and εit is a random 
perturbation.
This equation allows us to calculate daily abnormal returns (ARi ) for each on company:
 ARit = Rit - (ai + biRmt) (4)
where ai and bi are the LS estimates obtained in regressions (3) using a period before 
the announcement of 145 days, an appropriate period of time for estimating the pa-
rameters according to available empirical evidence on event study (11). Parameters are 
estimated by LS (12).
Abnormal returns from stocks are averaged in a cross section across each day of the event
 N
window or study window, giving the average daily abnormal returns ARt = N
-1 Σ ARit.
 i = 1
Considering that the market may anticipate information regarding the event or that delays 
may occur in its announcement, we have an event period of 11 days around the date the 
collective agreement is signed, from day T1 = -5 to day T2 = +5. For a more comprehensive 
analysis we calculated the cumulative abnormal returns for the period (t1, t2) in order to 
fi nd the cumulative effect of the event.
 t2
 CAR(t1, t2), = ΣARt (5)
 t = t1
(10) For further information on the Event Study methodology see Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Hensen and 
Roll (1969).
(11) For the collective agreements signed in the fi rst months of 1995, we have used the daily performance of 1994 to 
complete the estimation period of 145 days prior to the event window.
(12) Parameters α and β have also been estimated with Theil’s non-parametric technique and the same results were 
obtained.
02_SabaterMARCOSNuevo.indd   646 19/12/08   12:45:53
Ana María Sabater Marcos y Joaquina Laffarga Briones
Spillover effect upon a labor event: an empirical analysis for the Spanish continuous market ARTÍCULOS DOCTRINALES 647
SPANISH JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING. Vol. XXXVII, n.º 140 · october-december 2008
If the signature of a fi rm-level collective agreement conveys new information to in-
vestors, the expected value of abnormal returns must be signifi cantly different from 
zero. In order to test this hypothesis we use Corrado’s test (1989) and the bootstrap 
technique. An analysis of the behaviour of abnormal returns in the study window indi-
cates that some of the distributions are slightly biased and show leptokurtosis. Indeed, 
Jarque-Bera’s test does not validate the normal distribution of the sample; and therefore, 
the proposed hypothesis must be tested using a non-parametric test consistent with ab-
sence of a normal distribution, such as the Corrado test (1989). As opposed to parametric 
tests, the Corrado test makes no pre-assumption regarding the distribution of returns, and 
is adapted to correct for infrequent trading (Corrado and Zivney, 1992). The expression of 
the statistic is as follows:
 1 1 1 N 1
 —— Σ [kit – —— (τ + 1)]  —— Σ [kit – —— (τ + 1)]   N i = 1 2 N i + 1 2 ————————————— = ——————————————— (6)
 S(K) 1 τ 1 N 1
 — Σ [—Σ[Kit – — (τ + 1)]]
2
 
τ
 t = 1 N i = 1 2
where kit is the rank allocated to the abnormal returns for stock i on day τ, τ is the number 
of days in the estimation and event period and N is the total number of cases.
Additionally, this study incorporates a further non-parametric test based on the bootstrap 
methodology, and consisting of obtaining the empirical distribution of the target variable 
and testing its signifi cance based on the simulated distribution. The distribution of the 
conventional t statistic is simulated in order to obtain critical values from the simulated 
distribution. In order to obtain the empirical distribution M = 10.000 sub-samples are 
subtracted with replacement of size Ni = 100% of the original sample {Xi: i = 1,…..,N}:
{Xb,i: i = 1,…,Nb} for b = 1,…,M 
The following statistic is calculated for each sub-sample: 
 X
—
b – X
—
 tb = —————   for b = 1,…,M (7) σ^(Xb,i)/  Nb
where X
—
b and σ^(Xb,i) are the mean average and standard deviation of sub-sample b.
Following this process, if the number of extracted sub-samples M is high, we obtain a sam-
ple of bootstrap statistics {tb: b = 1,…,M} large enough to obtain the empirical distribution 
of the conventional t statistic. Using the percentiles of this distribution we can establish the 
acceptation and rejection regions. Thus, the critical values XL and Xu for an α signifi cance 
level (bilateral contrast) will be those for which:
 α
 Pr(tb ≤  XL ) = Pr(tb ≥ Xu ) = —— (8) 2
the null hypothesis will be rejected if t ≤ XL or t ≥ Xu .
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In order to analyse the robustness of the results obtained in the event study, we have 
added to the traditional methodology an alternative fi lter for the identifi cation of economi-
cally signifi cant abnormal returns (13). We consider as atypical performance those abnormal 
returns that fall out of the internal range, comprising two standard deviation, above and 
below the abnormal returns calculated over the 145-day period prior to the event. Normal 
returns are computed based on the market model for the calculation of abnormal returns. 
We consider those that fall out of the range to be signifi cant and test the signifi cance of the 
selected abnormal returns using Corrado’s non-parametric test. The results are the same 
as in the traditional methodology (14).
4.2. EFFECT ON THE COMPANIES WITH FIRM LEVEL AGREEMENT OR EVENT SAMPLE
The evidence found through the analysis of changes in stock prices of companies signing a 
fi rm-level agreement is that announcing the signature of this type of agreement has a nega-
tive and signifi cant impact on stock prices. The results of the signifi cance test of the abnor-
mal returns for the companies that have signed a fi rm-level agreement appear in Table 4.
TABLA 4
ABNORMAL RETURNS EVENT SAMPLE CORRADO’S TEST (1989)
TECHNIQUE. N = 84
DAY AR BOOTSTRAP CORRADO
-5 -0.0029 -1.308 -1.031
-4 0.0003 0.272 -0.713
-3 0.0005 0.228 -0.120
-2 0.0019 1.096 -0.653
-1 -0.0020 -1.009 -1.809*
0 -0.0028 -2.035** -1.971**
1 -0.0017 -1.083 -1.375
2 -0.0031 -2.153** -1.532
3 -0.0001 -0.091 -1.366
4 -0.0030 -1.672* -1.035
5 -0.0006 -0.285 -0.985
WINDOW CAR BOOTSTRAP CORRADO
(-5,+5) -0.0135 -2.305*** -2.235**
(-1,+1) -0.0063 -2.578*** -2.373***
(Continúa pág. sig.)
(13) For this purpose we followed the methodology applied by Ryan and Taffl er (2004).
(14) The market model prediction relies on the historical relationship between a fi rm and the stock market. If news of a 
collective agreement is leaked to investors during the model estimation period, however, that news will bias the fi rm’s model 
parameters and, in turn, result in the CARs in response to the announcement being incorrect. Using market-adjusted returns 
enables the researcher to avoid estimating market model parameters that may be biased by the anticipation or ex-post effect 
of the labour agreement. Therefore, market adjusted returns were used as well. We obtain the same results as in market model 
prediction.
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WINDOW CAR BOOTSTRAP CORRADO
(-2,+2) -0.0076 -2.327*** -2.366**
(-5,-1) -0.0022 -0.325 -1.682*
(+1,+5) -0.0085 -2.387*** -2.127**
  * Signifi cantly different at 10%.
 ** Signifi cantly different at 5%.
*** Signifi cantly different at 1%.
The fi rst panel shows the abnormal returns for each day in the event window (-5,+5); the 
third and fourth columns show the results of Corrado’s (1989) test and the non-parametric 
bootstrap technique.
The most signifi cant changes in returns take place on the day of the agreement and the 
previous day. The average abnormal returns on the day of the event is -0.28%, and Corra-
do’s test and the bootstrap test both give signifi cant values of -1.97 and -2.03 respectively. 
Average abnormal returns on the day before the announcement are of -0.20%; this fi gure 
is also negative and signifi cant only for Corrado’s test. The sharpest reduction in stock 
prices takes place on day +2 reaching a value of -0.31%, signifi cant for the bootstrap test.
The presence of negative abnormal returns on the day before the event seems to indicate 
information leaks from alternative sources (i.e.: online information), allowing investors to 
anticipate the information content of labour-related event.
Panel 2 Table 3 summarises the cumulative abnormal returns by means of different win-
dows around the event.
Cumulative average abnormal returns in event window (-5,+5) are -1.35%, highly signifi -
cant for all the tests used. The same result is observed for windows (-2,+2) and (-1,+1). We 
also observe signifi cant negative abnormal returns in pre-event windows, such as (-5,-1) 
with a p-value of -1.68, signifi cant for Corrado’s non-parametric test, or post-event win-
dows such as (+1,+5), signifi cant for both tests. If we consider the value of cumulative 
average abnormal returns, we see that the lowest value, i.e.: the period in which stock 
prices suffer the sharpest falls, is the period between day -1 and day +1. Cumulative aver-
age abnormal returns for window (-5,-1) are -0.22%; -0.65% for (-1,+1) and the strongest 
decrease is for window (+1,+5), accounting for -0.98%, all signifi cant for the bootstrap test. 
If we add more days to the windows, we see that stock prices fall further in post window 
events, for example (+1,+5), than in window (-5,-1).
The leaking of information before zero moment, as evidenced by pre-event abnormal 
returns, window (-5,-1) for example, may be due to the fact that in certain bargaining 
processes, a pre-agreement is reached between trade unions and management some 
days before signature of the collective agreement and until the fi nal text is drafted, and 
this may be reported by the media. This would explain market reaction before the event 
date.
TABLA 4 (cont.)
ABNORMAL RETURNS EVENT SAMPLE CORRADO’S TEST (1989)
TECHNIQUE. N = 84
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Our fi ndings are consistent with previous research (Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984, for US 
market; Inurrieta, 1997a, Sabater y Laffarga, 2006 for Madrid Stock Market). 
The study was extended to a wider event window —(-30,+30) days— although no sig-
nifi cant changes were detected in the margin for window (-5,+5). Therefore, in the days 
following to the signing, gradually the market incorporates this information into the stock 
prices. The defi nition of the window chosen is of the major importance, given that the 
majority of abnormal negative returns are signifi cantly different from zero in this window. 
This result supports of semi-strong effi ciency in Spanish Stock Market 
The results obtained for abnormal returns suggest that investors agree to interpret the 
information content of the event as bad news and incorporate this information in their 
decision making process in the days following the signature of a fi rm-level collective 
agreement.
4.3. SPILLOVER EFFECT. RESULT BY INDUSTRY
Once the negative reaction of investors of companies with a fi rm level agreement has been 
verifi ed, it is possible to consider if this event has also information value for investors of 
competing companies. In order to do so, we analyze and cumulative abnormal returns of 
competing companies by sector, for the twelve days in the event window.
Previous work on spillover effect shows that the publication of the signature of a company 
agreement has information value for investors of competing companies. Table 5 shows the 
results of the signifi cance test of daily abnormal returns for the competing companies, by 
industry. Bootstrap technique and the non-parametric test of Corrado (1989) were used.
Applying Corrado and bootstrap, the average abnormal return of the day of the event or 
zero moment is negative and signifi cant between 5% and 1%, for Paper products, Chemical 
products, Machinery construction industry, Transport and communications and Financial. 
For these sectors, signifi cant negative abnormal returns appear around the zero moment, 
specifi cally, in days -1, 0 and 1, reaching to -2 and 2 in the fi nancial sector.
Positive daily abnormal returns also appear in the around day of the event for: Food and 
beverages, Non-metallic mineral products, Electronic material and Trade and other serv-
ices, with a signifi cance level ranking between 10% and 5% in the tests applied.
Petroleum, Non-metal mineral products, Metal industry, and Electric power do not show 
statistically signifi cant abnormal returns. This could indicate a specifi c reaction in these 
sectors.
Daily analysis of the average abnormal returns shows a priori statistically signifi cant re-
sults. Sign and magnitude may vary depending on the sector under study. Hence, and by 
using the accumulated abnormal magnitudes, we can determine the accumulated effect of 
the event (15).
(15) With the hope to make data reading easier, Table 6 displays the results of both tests only for the most representative 
windows of the event period. 
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In Table 6, the accumulated average abnormal returns through different study windows 
are considered again for each sector; bootstrap and Corrado’s non parametric test are 
applied.
TABLA 6
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS COMPETING COMPANIES. CORRADO’S AND BOOTSTRAP TESTS
The table shows cumulative average abnormal returns CAR per industry for competing companies. Bootstrap statistic and Corrado 
(1989) statistic.
INDUSTRY WINDOW (-5,+5) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-5,-1) (+1,+5)
S1
N = 35
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.032
1.861*
1.810*
0.009
2.294**
1.990*
0.015
1.933*
1.871*
0.006
1.846*
1.780*
0.006
0.949
0.924
S2
N = 16
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.024
-2.011**
-1.970*
-0.016
16
-2.699***
-1.985**
-0.019
-1.840*
-1.735*
-0.009
-0.239
-0.181
-0.017
-0.714
-0.987
S3
N = 13
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.006
0.490
1.277
0.001
0.206
0.124
0.007
1.262
0.911
0.005
0.626
1.404
0.004
0.160
0.704
S4
N = 22
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.037
-1.617
-0.629
-0.012
-1.969**
-1.914*
-0.017
-1.698*
-1.645*
-0.019
-1.230
-0.600
-0.015
-0.452
-0.157
S5
N = 19
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.025
0.935
1.226
0.018
0.864
0.977
0.021
1.258
0.993
-0.008
-0.430
-0.641
0.041
1.985**
2.226**
S6
N = 7
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.025
-0.724
-0.123
-0.021
-1.190
-0.900
-0.009
-0.436
-0.224
-0.026
-1.237
-0.545
-0.002
-0.508
-0.198
S7
N = 45
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.008
-1.732*
-1.703*
-0.024
-3.586***
-2.931***
-0.016
-1.688*
-1.870*
0.000
-0.921
-1.095
-0.021
-1.468
-1.662*
S8
N = 54
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.045
1.985**
1.765*
0.018
1.263
0.808
0.028
1.410
1.246
0.033
1.966**
2.051**
0.015
0.869
0.196
S9
N = 84
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.000
0.054
0.842
0.002
0.179
0.147
0.002
0.368
0.512
0.005
1.333
0.522
-0.005
-1.818*
-1.888*
S10
N = 31
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.018
1.833*
1.986**
0.009
2.383***
2.527***
0.011
2.053**
2.050**
0.013
1.896*
1.657*
0.008
0.289
0.317
S11
N = 55
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.018
-1.651*
-0.760
-0.016
-2.792***
-1.410
-0.023
-3.633***
-1.984**
-0.011
-1.168
-0.535
-0.015
-0.934
-0.731
S12
N = 66
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.051
-2.283***
-2.464***
-0.037
-1.962**
-2.042**
-0.045
-1.987**
-2.182**
-0.016
-1.256
-1.487
-0.047
-1.688*
-1.898*
The industries are S1 = Food and beverage; S2 = Paper products; S3 = Petroleum, refi ned petroleum products and processing of radioactive materials; 
S4 = Chemical products; S5 = Non-metallic mineral products; S6 = Basic metal; S7 = Industrial machinery; S8 = Electronic material; S9 = Electric power; 
S10 = Trade and other services; S11 = Transport and communication; S12 = Financial. 
* Signifi cantly different at 10%; ** Signifi cantly different at 5%; *** Signifi cantly different at 1%.
02_SabaterMARCOSNuevo.indd   652 19/12/08   12:45:53
Ana María Sabater Marcos y Joaquina Laffarga Briones
Spillover effect upon a labor event: an empirical analysis for the Spanish continuous market ARTÍCULOS DOCTRINALES 653
SPANISH JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING. Vol. XXXVII, n.º 140 · october-december 2008
In window (-5, +5), accumulated abnormal returns negatives can be detected in several 
sectors. Paper products, machinery construction industry, transport and communications, 
and fi nancial intermediation display values -2,4%, -0,8%, -1,8% and -5,1% respectively; 
signifi cant for bootstrap. These results improve as the windows created are shorter and 
closer to the day of the signature of the company agreement. These sectors display, in 
particular, negative abnormal returns signifi cantly different from zero in windows (-1, +1) 
and (2, +2) with a signifi cance for Corrado and bootstrap oscillating between 5% and 1%. 
Moreover Chemical industry displays a -1,2% value in the window (-1, +1), signifi cant to 
5% for bootstrap.
Let us consider windows (-5, -1) and (+1, +5), for pre and post event reaction respectively. 
Financial is the only sector with signifi cant returns in post event. The rest of the sectors do 
not display statistically important reactions, except during the windows next to zero mo-
ment. This result could indicate that investors of these competing companies react on the 
days closer to the announcement of the agreement.
As previously argued for those sectors with greater degree of concentration of the produc-
tive supply, the signature of a company agreement can entail a review of salary agreements 
in the rest of competing companies due to a demonstration effect. A negative spillover 
effect may be expected in these sectors. As negative and signifi cant abnormal returns indi-
cate, negative spillover effect can be particularly pointed out in Paper Industry, Machinery 
construction industry, Chemical products, Transport and communications and Financial. 
These sectors are the most concentrated (see Table 3). Therefore, investors of these sectors 
interpret the information value of the agreement as bad news. Thus, their stock prices are 
penalized on the risk of the demand for greater wages or, even, the proposal of the signa-
ture of a company agreement, mimicking therefore the behavior of the leading company 
of the sector one an agreement of this type has been signed. In addition, if we consider the 
leading company the largest fi rm, or the one with the greatest participation quota over 
the others, one can appreciate in the descriptive analysis (Table 2) that it is the largest 
companies the most concentrated sectors that signed company agreements. This could 
indicate that a leader-follower strategy is taking place justifying the negative reaction in 
these sectors.
These results are along the lines of Bronars and Deere (1994) for the American market; 
for the Spanish market, Inurrieta (1997a) also fi nds negative spillover effect sign before an 
increase of the union power in sectors with a greater level of concentration in the produc-
tive supply.
Therefore, and according to the results obtained, negative spillover effect exists in those 
sectors with greater level of concentration.
On a different line, as shown in Table 6, Food and beverage, Electronic material and Trade 
display accumulated abnormal returns signifi cantly different from zero at 5% for boot-
strap, but with a positive sign. Values for these sectors vary between +3% and +8% in 
windows (-5, +5), (-2, +2), (-1, +1) and (-5, -1). Unlike the results presented in the previ-
ous paragraphs, investors in these sectors start reacting days before the signature of the 
agreement, as indicated by the presence of signifi cant abnormal returns at 10% in window 
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(-5, -1) with a +0.006 value for Food industry, +0.013 for Trade and a +0.033 value for 
electronic material signifi cant at 5% for both tests.
This result indicates investors of the Food and beverage, Electronic material and Trade in-
terpret positively the company agreement and their stock prices get the bonus of a positive 
return excess with respect to what was to be expected for that date. A possible explanation 
for this situation could again be derived in the degree of concentration.
If we consider Table 3, we can see that these sectors display a lower level of concentration 
of their productive supply, that is to say, they are sectors in which the companies share the 
market in the same proportion. Along these lines, as Bárcena and Inurrieta argue (1997), if 
a company of this type of sector decides to renegotiate the wages framework, the increase 
in labor and production costs induce an important loss market share which benefi ts the 
competing company in two ways: the workers, with wage increases and, the shareholders, 
with greater returns due to the greater market share.
Therefore, positive spillover effect exists in sectors with lower level of concentration of the 
productive supply.
With respect to Petroleum, Non-metallic mineral products, Basic metal and Electrical 
power, the results indicate that, for these sectors, spillover effect does not occur when 
signifi cant abnormal returns are absent. The exception to be noted is the post event 
window (+1, +5) with signifi cant negative for electric power and positive abnormal re-
turns for manufacture of other mineral non-metal products. As Bronars and Deere argue 
(1994), this result can be due to heterogeneity among the competing companies in the 
industry. Companies in these industries could also carry out different activities which 
can not always be classifi ed within one industry. This fact may create distortion in the 
results.
Results for Petroleum, refi ned petroleum products and processing of radioactive materi-
als should be specifi cally emphasized. As indicated by their high degree of concentration 
and as defi ned in the hypotheses, a negative spillover effect was to be expected. A possible 
explanation for this result can be found in the specifi c characteristics of the sector: all the 
companies in the sector have a fi rm level agreement. When a company of this sector signs 
a fi rm-level agreement, the reaction expected from the competition is, a priori, is positive. 
As Bárcena and Inurrieta (1997) argue, this is due to the fact that the possible competitive 
advantage the signatory company could get via operational costs disappears when a new 
collective agreement is signed, thus making all companies in the sector compete on a equal 
basis. Hence the negative effect expected due to the concentration level is compensated by 
the positive effect mentioned in our argument. This is the reason for the absence of statisti-
cally signifi cant abnormal returns.
According to the results obtained, we can conclude that there is spillover effect in some 
sectors of the Spanish economy upon the signature of a fi rm level collective agreement. 
However the sign of this effect depends on the specifi c characteristics of the sector, par-
ticularly, on the level of concentration of the productive supply. Therefore, the two fi rst 
hypotheses presented study can be confi rmed.
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4.4. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS. METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this second analysis is to try assess the existence of a consistent relationship 
a between companies with their own agreement and competing companies. Once demon-
strated that the signature of this type of agreements has a negative and signifi cant impact 
on the market (see Table 4), we verifi ed whether the average return for a portfolio com-
posed by shares of competing companies differs from the return of a portfolio composed by 
shares of the companies with a fi rm level agreement.
Once again more, and as done before, we have analyzed spillover effect for each of the sectors 
represented by the companies in the sample, but with the particular aim to establish a relation 
between the competing company and the company signing its own agreement. Thus:
 Rit = αi + βi REVENTSAMPLEt + εit (9)
where Rit is the return of competing company i on day t; REVENTSAMPLEt is the return of the 
company with fi rm level agreement on day t; αi is the expected return of company i, 
which is independent from the return of the company with agreement; βi is the sensiti-
vity of the return of competing company i to changes in returns of the company signing 
the collective agreement; and εit is a random error term.
This equation allows us to calculate abnormal daily returns (ARi ) for information on com-
peting company i:
 ARit = Rit - (ai + biREVENTSAMPLEt) (10)
where ai and bi are the LS estimates obtained in the regressions (9) using a period before 
the announcement of 145 days.
Abnormal returns are averaged in a cross section across each day of the event window
 N
ARt = N
-1ΣARit.
 it
 We use again an 11 day period for the event and the date of the signature of the company 
agreement is zero moment, from day T1 = -5 to day T2 = +5. In order to offer a more com-
plete analysis, we calculated the accumulated abnormal returns CAAt in a period (t1, t2) as 
defi ned in Equation 5.
Once again, we tested the signifi cance of the average abnormal returns through non-par-
ametric test of Corrado (1989) and the nonparametric technique bootstrap (16). We tried to 
verify with this analysis whether the link between the competing company and the signing 
company has varied in the study window during the event window.
4.5. RESULTS ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
Daily abnormal returns of competing companies by sector are shown in Table 7. They are 
calculated based on the returns of the company with an agreement. Although this sign and 
(16) Just as it happened in the previous case, we have not used abnormal returns out of the range chosen, as done by Ryan 
and Taffl er (2004). We have reached the same results got with the classic method. 
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magnitude of the effect vary depending on the sector under study, there are signifi cant 
Positive abnormal daily returns for the majority of sectors.
Table 8 shows the analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns for the competing compa-
nies. They are calculated based on the returns obtained by the company that has signed 
the agreement. Through the different windows and in each sector, the mean effi ciency of 
a portfolio composed by shares of competing companies is always greater that the one 
obtained by the company which signs the agreement.
TABLA 8
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETUNS FOR COMPETING COMPANIES REGARDING EVENT SAMPLE.
CORRADO’S AND BOOTSTRAP TESTS. 
Rit = αi + βiREVENTSAMPLE + εit
ARit = Rit - (ai + biREVENTSAMPLE)
INDUSTRY WINDOW (-5,+5) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-5,-1) (+1,+5)
S1
N = 35
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.027
1.751*
1.645*
0.018
1.925*
1.820*
0.021
1.857*
1.772*
0.009
1.644*
1.553
0.011
1.245
1.226
S2
N = 16
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.005
-1.315
-1.268
0.008
1.870*
1.744*
0.009
1.667*
1.698*
-0.002
-0.976
-0.852
-0.012
-0.233
-0.135
S3
N = 13
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.007
1.257
1.267
0.010
1.646*
1.614
0.012
1.075
1.067
0.002
0.576
1.357
0.002
0.160
0.704
S4
N = 22
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.016
-1.467
-1.289
0.002
1.957*
2.364***
0.001
1.588
1.755*
-0.003
-0.275
-0.600
-0.016
-1.428
-1.354
S5
N = 19
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.004
0.935
1.226
0.006
1.664*
1.977**
0.002
1.258
0.993
0.004
0.430
0.641
-0.004
-0.985
-0.226
S6
N = 7
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.003
-0.724
-0.123
-0.003
-0.990
-1.100
0.002
1.436
1.224
-0.007
-1.237
-0.545
0.006
1.708*
1.998**
S7
N = 45
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.002
1.432
1.203
0.013
1.786*
1.931*
0.017
1.688*
1.870*
-0.001
-0.921
-1.095
-0.003
-1.468
-1.262
S8
N = 54
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.032
1.985**
1.765*
0.015
2.263**
2.808***
0.017
1.910*
1.846*
0.017
1.966**
2.051**
0.014
0.869
1.196
S9
N = 84
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.002
1.654*
1.542
0.007
2.579***
2.147**
0.010
1.968**
1.951*
0.001
1.333
0.522
-0.001
-0.818
-0.897
S10
N = 31
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
0.039
2.333***
2.077**
0.019
2.383***
2.227**
0.023
1.953*
1.950*
0.024
1.896*
1.657*
0.009
1.989**
1.717*
S11
N = 55
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.004
-0.651
-0.760
0.006
2.792***
1.910*
0.008
2.633***
1.984**
0.001
1.168
0.535
-0.006
-0.934
-1.071
S12
N = 66
CAR
bootstrap
corrado
-0.017
-1.060
-0.305
0.015
1.554
1.098
0.005
0.895
1.186
-0.011
-1.304
-1.038
0.001
0.134
0.443
The industries are S1 = Food and beverage; S2 = Paper products; S3 = Petroleum, refi ned petroleum products and processing of radioactive materials; 
S4 = Chemical products; S5 = Non-metallic mineral products; S6 = Basic metal; S7 = Industrial machinery; S8 = Electronic material; S9 = Electric power; 
S10 = Trade and other services; S11 = Transport and communication; S12 = Financial. * Signifi cantly different at 10%; ** signifi cantly different at 5%; 
*** signifi cantly different at 1%.
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On the one hand, we can derive from the results that the average return of a portfo-
lio comprising including shares of companies from Food and beverage, Non-metallic 
mineral products, Industrial machinery, Electric power, Electronic material and Trade 
is signifi cantly greater than the return of a portfolio comprising including shares of a 
company that has signed a fi rm-level agreement. On the other hand, the return ob-
tained by a portfolio of shares of competing companies in the Paper, Chemical, Metal 
Industry, or even Financial sector, for example, is not signifi cantly different from the 
one obtained by a company of any of these sectors which has agreed with their em-
ployees about their own labor and economic conditions. This would indicate that both 
types of companies are penalized by the market in the same way the days close to the 
announcement of the agreement.
Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) argue that during the negotiation of a company agree-
ment, approximately 6 months, the returns of the companies that negotiate the agree-
ment are signifi cantly lower than the returns of the rest of companies. This difference 
is even more remarkable in the days close to the announcement. Nevertheless, this 
difference disappears within the six months after the event. This is because during 
the months of negotiation of the agreement, the market reacts by penalizing shares 
because of the risk of a strike or a confl ict inherent to all collective negotiation. Once 
the negotiations are concluded and upon the signature of the agreement, the informa-
tion is negatively interpreted by the investor in the face of the agreed increase in labor 
costs and the subsequent decrease of the future cash-fl ow, as shown in Table 4. Hence, 
for the majority of sectors, the mean effi ciency of a portfolio composed by shares of 
competing companies is superior to the effi ciency of a portfolio composed by shares of 
companies with their own agreement. The results obtained in Tables 7 and 8 allow us 
to verify therefore the last hypothesis of the study. 
5.  SPILLOVER EFFECT DETERMINANTS UPON THE ANNOUNCEMENT
OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
Once the spillover effect in the Spanish Stock Market before the signature of a collective 
agreement for a company has been analyzed, it is interesting to examine the possibility of 
explaining these changes referring to some of the company characteristics. In order to do 
so, the accumulated abnormal returns in (CAAi) for the window (-5, +5) are regressed on 
these variables, as indicated in Equation 11. The goal is to analyze which characteristic of 
the competing companies determines the abnormal returns observed in the study window. 
The abnormal returns observed around the date of the event are analyzed in terms of size, 
results of the year prior to the signature of the agreement, and the sector itself.
 12 24 36
 CAAi = Σβi Industryi + Σβi Indi ⋅  Size + Σβi Indi ⋅  Earningsi + μ i (11)
 k = 1 k = 13 k = 25
The industries are S1 = Food and beverage; S2 = Paper products; S3 = Petroleum, Re-
fi ned petroleum products and processing of radioactive materials; S4 = Chemical products; 
S5 = Non-metallic mineral products; S6 = Basic metal; S7 = Industrial machinery; S8 = Elec-
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tronic material; S9 = Electric power; S10 = Trade and other services; S11 = Transport and 
communication; S12 = Financial.
It has been empirically verifi ed that larger companies in Spain have a greater chance 
of undertaking internal collective bargaining (Jimeno and Rodriguez, 1996). The com-
parison of labour costs with other companies in the same industry is less important 
for these companies. The market position is not signifi cant affected by the fact that 
other companies assume lower costs, since their own economic conditions allow them 
assume higher costs without having to transfer them to their products. On the other 
hand, the almost always lesser complexity of smaller companies means that labour 
costs and working conditions are crucial. The sample tests the effect of size on the 
abnormal magnitudes observed around the event date. Theoretically the sign of the 
correlation between size and abnormal returns is positive, as larger companies are 
less punished by the markets, owing, for example, to the higher quantity and quality 
of the information they disclose to the market (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). This same 
reasoning can be applied to annual results: companies with better accounts will be 
least penalised by investors. 
The inclusion of industry dummies is especially important, as they show in which indi-
vidual industries the effect of signing a fi rm-level collective agreement is more important 
in stock market terms. We have created as many dummy variables as industries. The cri-
terion followed for the classifi cation of companies into industries is as established by the 
CNAE-93 for 12 industries. Table 1 shows the distribution of the companies in the sample 
and their competitors into sectors.
A prior analysis of the correlation matrix of the variables shows a certain multicol-
linearity, the impact of which on the fi nal results is limited by selecting non-collinear 
independent dimensions. Thus, the equations presented for the model are different 
combinations of company variables, designed in order to collectively overcome the 
multicollinearity problem.
We also used White’s test to verify homocedasticity, allowing us to accept the null hypoth-
esis of equality of residue variances, Jarque-Bera’s test confi rms normality of residues, 
evidencing the presence of homocedasticity. However, Durbin-Watson’s test accepts the 
presence of residue self-correlation of order 1. Consequently, the estimate is done by LS, 
considering that the signifi cance levels of the quotients have been determined from the 
variance-covariance matrix robust to Newey-West’s general self-correlation forms (17) (18).
Table 9 summarizes the results of the cross section regressions for the abnormal returns 
derived from the market model.
(17) According to Karafi ath (1994), the LS procedure seems to be more effi cient than other more complex methods when 
abnormal returns are the dependent variables; this is the case even in situations with heterocedasticity residues and cor-
related with independent variables.
(18) Since the number of observations in analysis by size and year results may be low, regression coeffi cients have been 
estimated by means of bootstrap non parametric technique in order to strengthen the analysis. We obtained the same results 
as in the MCO calculation.
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TABLA 9
DETERMINANTS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS. WINDOW (-5,+5)
Results of the regression analysis aimed at detecting which factors can be considered to explain the changes in the abnormal return in the 
window (-5,+5) for competing companies using market model. The fi rst column shows the regression of abnormal returns on industry 
dummies; the second column on industry dummies multiplied for size variable and the third column with earnings variable. N = 447.
 12 24 36
CARi = Σβi Industryi + Σβi Industryi Sizei + Σβi Indi Earningsi + μi 
 k = 1 k = 13 k = 25
INDUSTRY ONLY INDUSTRY SIZE INDUSTRY EARNINGS INDUSTRY
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
+0.025**
-0.037**
+0.011
-0.024
-0.012
-0.015
+0.009
+0.015
+0.034**
-0.013
-0.036***
+0.009
+0.017**
+0.009
+0.016*
-0.005
-0.006
-0.007
+0.007
-0.016*
+0.009
+0.015**
+0.003
+0.001*
+0.001
+0.005*
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
+0.005
-0.002
+0.000
+0.003***
R2
Pr(F)
0.29
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.27
0.00
The industries are S1 = Food and beverage; S2 = Paper products; S3 = Petroleum, refi ned petroleum products and processing of radioactive materials; S4 = Chemical products; S5 =  Non-
metallic mineral products; S6=Basic metal; S7 = Industrial machinery; S8 = Electronic material; S9 = Electric power; S10 = Trade and other services; S11 = Transport and communication; 
S12 = Financial. SIZE = Ln Market capitalization, EARNINGS = annual results/Total Assets. CARi = Cumulative abnormal returns using market model for the window (-5,+5).
* Signifi cantly different at 10%; ** signifi cantly different at 5%; *** signifi cantly different at 1%.
As shown in the fi rst column, when the industry specifi c dummies are considered included, 
the only sectors whose returns are affected signifi cantly in a positive way by the signature 
of the agreement are: Trade, and Food and beverage, as it has also been shown in the win-
dows with signifi cant and positive abnormal returns for these sectors. Paper products and 
Financial display a signifi cant and negative sign.
The impact of the event on returns is more noticeable when the dummies interaction with 
the characteristics of the company was considered in the regression. In this case, bigger 
companies and with better results within Paper, Financial and Chemical Industries are less 
penalized by the investor. However larger companies in Trade obtain minor advantages as 
it indicated by the negative sign in this regression. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
Our results are consistent with previous empirical studies on spillover effect. The evidence 
presented here demonstrates that there is a clear relationship between fi rm-level collec-
tive negotiation in a company and the returns of the competing companies. Sign and mag-
nitude of this relationship depend on the industry and the level of concentration of the 
productive supply there in.
Thus, within industries with monopolistic competition in which the biggest company mo-
nopolize a greater market share, the fact that one company signs its own agreement in-
duce a negative reaction in the stock prices of competing companies. This is due to a 
demonstration effect in the strategy leader-follower, in the face of a possible demand for 
higher wages by the workers or even a proposal to negotiate a company agreement imi-
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tating, thus, the behavior of the leading company in the industry. Conversely, in industries 
with a smaller degree of concentration industries in which companies share the market 
in a similar proportion, the fact that one of them signs its own agreement could derive in 
a loss of market share from which the competing companies will profi t: Investors of these 
companies react positively.
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